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firepower thanks to the broadside cannons, though it was still the bow
guns that proved to be the main striking force . In particular, the
16
ships developed and utilised by the English and Dutch merchants
dominated the Levant and were known as bertones, which were broad
and vigorous ships with three masts, armed with twenty to thirty can-
nons . In his case study of such an English galleon’s maritime fight
17
in 1617, Tinniswood expressed that the English vessel was protected
by nineteen large canons, nine smaller anti-personnel guns and a total
of thirty eight sailors . The Ottoman navy, on the other hand, es-
18
chewed the widespread use of galleons until the last quarter of the
seventeenth century despite having gained familiarity with them as
early as the fifteenth century .
19
The Ottoman reluctance to make use of galleons for a long while
and the disaster at Lepanto in 1571 have long been regarded as signs
of the Ottoman decline vis-a-vis the rest of Europe . Nonetheless, this
20
study will further the argument that neither in terms of technology
nor within the larger picture of Mediterranean maritime warfare were
they falling short of their immediate rivals. As will be shown below, if
there was anything missing in the Ottoman naval establishment, it
was not in material or technical capacities, but rather due to political
decisions in the administrative cadres.

3. Preparing the Navy: Grand Admiral Cafer Pasha

Ottoman grand admiralty was among the top-ranking offices of the
empire for most of the early modern period. Even though the admiralty
was supposed to be a majorly technical job given its maritime charac-
ter, the question of who would fill the office became a matter of debate,
particularly after the death of Hayreddin Barbarossa in 1546: would
it be a seafarer by profession or a bureaucrat with strong connections
to the palace? When the latter choice was opted for, the grand admiral
was strongly admonished to listen to the seafarers surrounding him,

16 J.F. Guilmartin, Galleons and Galleys, pp. 158-163; E.S. Tenace, Review:
Naval History, 1500-1680 by Jan Glete, «The Sixteenth Century Journal», 39, no.
2 (2008), 485-487, on page 486.
17 D. Goffman, Daniel, İzmir ve Levanten Dünya (1550-1650), (translated by
Ayşen Anadol and Neyir Kalaycıoğlu), Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000,
p. 34.
18 A. Tinniswood, 17. Yüzyılda Akdeniz’de Korsanlık: Denizler, Fetihler, Korsanlar,
Esaret, Politika, Yayılmacılık ve Bölünme, İnkılap Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, p. 94.
19 İ. Bostan, Osmanlılar Niçin Kalyon İnşasından Bir Süre İçin Vazgeçtiler?
(1656-1682), «Tarih Dergisi - Turkish Journal of History», 71, n. 1, (2020), pp. 223-
238, on p. 237.
20 J. Grant, Rethinking the Ottoman “Decline”, pp. 179, 186.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XX - Dicembre 2023
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)