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Contro ogni previsione: uno scontro navale nel Mediterraneo moderno... 539

reported to eventually meet with the main force of the imperial navy
moving out of the capital . A newspaper of the period corroborated
50
that report: the Ottoman navy in the Mediterranean that summer was
made up of forty five galleys and six galleons. Since the North African
51
corsairs were familiar with, and integrated into their navies, ‘broadside
sailing ships’ since the early seventeenth century , the newspaper
52
confirms that the Barbary forces did unite with the grand admiral at
a certain point, indeed.
It is difficult to ascertain when exactly the imperial forces were joined
by the Barbary fleets. In any case, the imperial fleet found its first target
before even moving out of the Sea of Marmara: an embassy report from
Istanbul suggested that upon arrival at the Dardanelles, Cafer Pasha
received intelligence relating to two English vessels. They were spotted
in the Aegean Sea, loading grain around the Greek coasts .
53
In Ottoman waters, loading grain onboard was a problematic issue
for any European merchant. Being a primary staple for the provision-
ing of cities, grain was under the strict supervision of Ottoman au-
thorities. The limitation on grain export was so serious that it was at
times altogether forbidden . For instance, when European merchants
54
tried to meet the Venetian need for grain via purchase from the Levant,
the Ottoman administration entirely prohibited grain export in 1594.
While such a prohibition prompted the emergence of the Baltic grain
as a viable alternative, its real effect on the Mediterranean was the
flourishing of contraband grain trafficking in the subsequent years.
Ottoman authorities had to focus ever more attention on controlling
grain smuggling starting with the end of the sixteenth century .
55

50 OeStA, HHStA, Türkei I, Turcica, 112-6. Constantinople, 12 June 1633, f.
82r. In general, there was a tendency to overestimate the Turkish navy during the
early modern era even when its size was typical of the time, see Tzavaras, Two
Perceptions of Süleyman’s ‘Magnificent’ Navy, p. 138.
51 Recueil de Gazettes, Nouvelles et Relations de toute l’Année 1633, Renaudot,
Paris, 1634, p. 345. This source will be referred to as Gazette.
52 J.M. White, Shifting Winds: Piracy, Diplomacy, and Trade in the Ottoman Med-
iterranean, 1624-1626, in P.W. Firges, T.P. Graf, C. Roth and G. Tulasoğlu (edited
by), Well-Connected Domains, Towards an Entangled Ottoman History. Brill, Lei-
den-Boston, 2014, pp. 37-53, on p. 42.
53 C. Haga, Brieven van Cornelis Haga aan de Staten-Generaal, 1631-1633, in
Kronijk van het Historisch Genootschap, gevestigd te Utrecht, XXI, 5, no. 2 (1867),
pp. 370-455, on page 436.
54 The first documented prohibition on grain export seems to have been put into
effect in 1555, see Z. Arıkan, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İhracı Yasak Mallar (Memnu
Meta), in Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu’na Armağan. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fa-
kültesi Tarih Araştırma Merkezi, Istanbul, 19991, pp. 279-306, on pp. 284-289.
55 M.Z. Köse, 1600-1630 Osmanlı Devleti ve Venedik: Akdeniz’de Rekabet ve
Ticaret, Giza, İstanbul, 2010, pp. 128-129; D. Goffman, Daniel, İzmir ve Levanten
Dünya (1550-1650), (Ayşen Anadol and Neyir Kalaycıoğlu trans.), Tarih Vakfı Yurt
Yayınları, Istanbul, 2000, pp. 31-35.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XX - Dicembre 2023
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)