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556                                                       David Laven


                   There was one other aspect on which Sismondi focused that reso-
                nates with Venetian accounts: the neglect of and contempt for military
                careers. Expressing views close to those of his friend Mme de Staël in
                Corinne and of Stendhal in La Chartreuse de Parme, not to mention of
                the  thousands  of  Napoleonic  officers  who  engaged  in  publicly  per-
                formed  contempt  for  the  population  of  the  peninsula ,  Sismondi
                                                                       55
                pointed to the supposed fact that powerful, rich, noble Italians had no
                shame in avowing «hautement  leur pusillanimité»: «Ils parlent sans
                rougir  de  la  grande  peur  qu’ils  ont  eue,  ils  confessent  que  leurs
                femmes ont plus courage qu’eux [...]» . The problem for Sismondi was
                                                    56
                that Venice did not fit comfortably into this narrative: it displayed a
                marked independence from Rome; it never fell under Spanish hegem-
                ony; moreover, it continued in the seventeenth century – not least in
                the defence of Candia and in its wars against the Uskoks – to demon-
                strate considerable military resolve.
                   While Sismondi did appreciate Venice’s independence from Rome,
                he displayed a more ambivalent attitude to Venetian military power in
                the face of the Ottoman threat in the eastern Mediterranean. He rec-
                ognised that, through most of the seventeenth century, the Venetians
                remained capable of defeating the Turks at sea; and he acknowledged
                that when the Venetian army encountered the Ottomans it was capa-
                ble of victory, albeit less often and less convincingly. He noted too the
                valour the Venetians during the siege of Candia. Nevertheless, in his
                treatment of the loss of Crete, Sismondi put greater emphasis on the
                devastating effects it had for Venetian power, than on the fact that
                Venetians displayed much of  their  old  warrior  spirit. Sismondi  was
                rather less impressed by the brief Venetian reconquest of Morea: his
                account was of failure and decline, when he might have stressed that
                the Republic, albeit beleaguered and lacking its former economic and
                fiscal strength, could still wage effective campaigns. Unfairly, he as-
                cribed the credit for the brief re-establishment of Venetian power on
                the  Greek  mainland  to  a  «général  suédois»  (Otto  Wilhelm  von  Kö-
                nigsmarck) rather than to the valiant Venetian, and future doge, Fran-
                cesco Morosini . Sismondi was especially critical of the nature of rule
                              57
                of the Stato da Mar, which he presented as exploitative of – and hated
                by – the Republic’s Greek subjects:




                   55  M. Broers, The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796-1814. Cultural imperialism in a
                European context, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005.
                   56  J.C.L.S. de Sismondi, Histoire des français cit., vol. xvi, pp. 453-4.
                   57  Ibidem, p. 283.



                Mediterranea – ricerche storiche – Anno XIX – Dicembre 2022
                ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa)  ISSN 1828-230X (online)
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