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The best-kept secret in the Mediterranean: Barbarossa’s 1534 Tunis campaign   385


                    Spanish occupation of Koron. Barbarossa was simply not ordered to
                    launch an attack on Tunis. His words are worth citing at length:

                       Hayreddin  Pasha  was  sent  to  the  seas.  He  was  supposed  to  avenge  the
                    atrocities committed by the infidel fleets in the provinces of the Muslims. However,
                    he did not go to the lands of the infidels but went instead to Tunis, which is in the
                    Maghreb. He arrived with the fleet at the port of Tunis. There was a castle called
                    La Goleta that protects Tunis. He took this castle and brought his ships to its
                    port. He landed there and moved on to Tunis. He captured the city and caused
                    many troubles and calamities to the Muslims and massacred the population.
                    Then he declared himself governor and settled in Tunis 37 .

                       As an independent source who allowed himself to be critical of his
                    time, Lutfi Pasha’s denial of any official authorization for Tunis is a
                    strong testimony in favour of the arguments that see the conquest as
                    Barbarossa’s  personal  initiative.  However,  his  account  stands  in
                    complete opposition to Bostan Çelebi or Matrakçı Nasuh, who praised
                    with  eulogistic  overtones  how  Barbarossa  made  Tunis  part  of  the
                    Ottoman realm on the orders of the sultan. Most importantly, Lutfi
                    Pasha’s  account  contradicts  the  official  Ottoman  register  that
                    indicated the destination of the armada as diyâr-ı Mağrib, somewhere
                    in  North  Africa  if  not  exactly  Tunis .  In  fact,  even  the  Gazavât
                                                          38
                    accepted that the fleet before it ostensibly diverted, had been heading
                    for  Algiers.  Therefore,  Lutfi  Pasha  seems  to  be  mistaken  when  he
                    believes that the objective of the fleet was limited to the infidel lands.
                    Besides, the fact that he did not mention Barbarossa’s attacks on the
                    Italian coastline demonstrates that he was not well-intentioned and to
                    an extent his account also distorted reality .
                                                              39
                       There is also another point worth considering. Lutfi Pasha did not
                    regard the conquest of Tunis as a legitimate act. On the contrary, he
                    was outraged by the massacre of Muslim Tunisian coreligionists and
                    specifically emphasises the fact that Barbarossa attacked a Muslim
                    polity and killed its Muslim population. Unlike the Süleymannâmes
                    and the Gazavât, Lutfi Pasha does not mention the alliance between
                    Mulay Hassan and Charles V as a justification of the conquest. While
                    this might be ascribed to malice or rivalry, perhaps, as someone who
                    at the time defended the Ottoman sultan’s right to the caliphate, Lutfi





                       37  K. Atik, Lütfi Paşa ve Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman [Lütfi Paşa and his Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman],
                    Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 2001, p. 272.
                       38  See footnote 9.
                       39  N. Vatin, Sur les objectifs cit., p. 183.


                                                Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
                                                           ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa)  ISSN 1828-230X (online)
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