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162 Hakalmaz Turaç

Under these circumstances, Aimery’s offer to establish the Latin hier-
archy on the island and his desire to elevate its status to a kingdom,
under the authority of a powerful emperor, Henry VI, was not just ec-
clesiastically appealing but also politically rational. For the pope, the
development of Cyprus was crucial for the future of other Crusader
states in the East. Thus, for instance, on November 20th, 1198, Pope
Innocent III sent a letter advising the military orders, the Crusader
states, and the principalities to support Aimery, a good example of the
political support available from an ecclesiastical policy that courted
papal favour .
39
The pope’s protection was exactly what Aimery sought, and his pol-
icy brought results in terms of his capacity to defend his kingdom - a
crucial element of sustaining his authority. Obviously, Aimery needed
soldiers to improve the severely weakened defences of the island . The
40
military orders, especially the Templars, the Hospitallers, and the Teu-
tonic Knights, perfectly suited his purpose, and, granting lands and
alms, Aimery encouraged them to establish themselves on the island.
Their support was not only significant in protecting the kingdom from
internal strife but was also a vital bulwark against external threats .
41
On the papacy’s side, moreover, the presence of the military orders on
the island gave them a valuable base for future expeditions to the Holy
Land, and fully justified their presence. This dual role of the military
orders worked well at the beginning of the thirteenth century, alt-
hough it proved of more variable benefit in the long run .
42
The problems Aimery faced were not limited to a rebellious popula-
tion and the direct military threat of Muslim and Byzantine action. He
also faced a crisis of external legitimacy with the potential to cause
long-term difficulties. His position and the position of Cyprus in the

39 O. Hageneder, A. Haidacher, A.A. Strnad, (eds.), Die Register Innocenz III 1198-
1199, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Graz, 1964, vol. 1,
pp. 661-2, n. 438; C. Schabel, (ed.), Bullarium, vol. 1, pp. 113-5, n. b-2 and b-4; Rrh, n.
747d.
40 However, the island had natural protection, for which, and the Pryor thesis, see
P. Edbury, Kingdoms of the Crusaders, XI cit., 235-6; J.H. Pryor, (ed.), Logistics of War-
fare in the Age of the Crusades, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2019; Idem, Geography, Technology
and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean 649-1571, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
41 For Templar and Hospitaller fortifications, see N. Coureas, Fluctuating Territorial-
ity: The Military Orders, cit., pp. 125-127, 130-131, 141-143; Idem, The Latin Church in
Cyprus cit., p. 121. For the relations with the Teutonic Order, see below.
42 The only military order that transferred their headquarters to Cyprus was the
Templars, who purchased the island in 1191. However, their rule did not last long.
The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Order, on the other hand, established their head-
quarters on Rhodes and in Prussia, not on the island. For a detailed discussion, see
Ivi, pp. 156-158.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XIX - Aprile 2022
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)