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370   María José Rodríguez Salgado, Rubén González Cuerva, Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra


                the  Adriatic  did  not  survive  the  internal  competition  between  the
                Christian powers over the spoils.
                   Even  without  the  Venetian  fleet,  the  largest  Christian  fleet  in  the
                region, but neutralised by its alliance with the Ottoman sultan, Charles
                V was able to gather an extraordinary mixture of naval forces in 1535
                from his own lands and those of his allies. The imperial fleet included
                ships  and  materials  from  the  Spanish  realms,  the  Low  Countries,
                Naples,  Sicily,  Genoa,  Florence,  the  Papal  states,  the  Knights  of  St.
                John, and Portugal. It was an impressive achievement. A fleet manned
                and transporting thousands of men who had never before fought in the
                Mediterranean, particularly the infantry levied in southern German and
                Swiss lands.
                   Factual accounts of the 1535 campaign, with more or less detailed
                descriptions of the main stages of the conflict are easy to come by. The
                five articles that make up this dossier address some of the many gaps
                in our knowledge of this campaign and challenge some of the enduring
                misconceptions that continue to circulate about the conflict. To do so,
                they  broaden  the  context  and  consider  the  situation  before  the
                campaign, as well as looking beyond the imperial alliance to how other
                powers  responded.  They  approach  the  topic  from  a  cosmopolitan
                viewpoint and share the fundamental aim of reconstructing the complex
                political  and  religious  situation.  The  contributors  set  themselves
                ambitious goals to cover important topics and fill gaps and have had to
                overcome serious problems due to limited source materials.
                   The dossier opens with the Ottoman-corsair conquest of Tunis in
                1534, a subject which has not been adequately studied to date. In the
                absence of Ottoman political correspondence, Evrim Türkçelik analysed
                the chronicles of the period as well as those of the following century to
                address the fundamental question whether Barbarossa launched the
                conquest of Tunis in 1534 under explicit orders from Süleyman, that is
                in order to execute an Ottoman strategy of expansion in the Maghreb;
                or if he commandeered the Ottoman forces under his command in order
                to carry out what was in essence a Muslim corsair strategy to control
                the Mediterranean by taking the most strategic ports in the region, and
                specifically Tunis which facilitated attacks on the Italian states. One of
                the chief merits of Türkçelik’s article is to offer a systematic analysis of
                the Ottoman sources and thereby to present an alternative perspective
                of the conflict from the point of view of a political culture that is very
                different from the dominant, Western vision.
                   Calculating  the  economic  impact  of  financing  an  amphibious
                expedition  of  the  magnitude  and  complexity  as  that  launched  by
                Charles V in 1535 is crucial. Levying and transporting some 30,000
                men from all over Europe and fitting out a fleet that probably reached





                Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
                ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa)  ISSN 1828-230X (online)
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