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Introduction                                                     369


                    with neighbouring Christian powers for centuries, as had many other
                    Muslim rulers in the Maghreb. This did not prevent them from tolerating
                    and benefitting from the activities of corsairs who preyed on Christian
                    shipping and coastlines. The real danger for Spain and, to a lesser extent,
                    Italy, came from Hayreddin Barbarossa once he consolidated power in
                    Algiers. His success attracted other corsairs and his power was reinforced
                    when he accepted the sovereignty the Ottoman empire. This destroyed
                    the equilibrium that had been reached in the Western Mediterranean.
                    The danger was compounded when he was appointed admiral – kapudan-
                    ı  derya  –  of  the  Ottoman  Mediterranean  fleet.  It  signalled  a  greater
                    commitment on the part of the Ottoman sultan to expand into the Central
                    and  Western  Mediterranean.  Süleyman  (1520-1566)  had  already
                    demonstrated  the  change  of  direction  in  Ottoman  policy  when  he
                    increased the navy and conquered Rhodes in 1522, expelling the most
                    committed and formidable Christian corsairs, the Knights of St. John.
                    That campaign, and the relentless Ottoman advance into Hungary and
                    Austria during the rest of that decade, exposed the internal divisions and
                    lack of cooperation among the Christian states.
                       Charles V was no less eager to develop a powerful Mediterranean
                    navy in the 1520s but it proved difficult to do while he was consolidating
                    his power over his scattered possessions and fighting the French. His
                    predecessor in Iberia, Ferdinand The Catholic, had marked the path to
                    follow with a series of campaigns in the 1490s which were part of a
                    strategy  to  ensure  the  security  of  the  Iberian  and  Italian  states  by
                    creating a defensive bulwark along the Maghrebian coast, first taking
                    key  ports  and  using  them  as  a  base  from  which  to  expand  into  the
                    neighbouring hinterland. North Africa was neither exotic nor peripheral
                    for the Spanish and Italian realms. States on both sides of the sea had
                    long  been  closely  connected  and  remained  so  despite  divergent
                    ideologies and political divisions. Charles V wanted to gain control over
                    the  Western  Mediterranean  but,  as  had  been  the  case  with  his
                    grandfather,  he  was  repeatedly  diverted  by  the  longstanding  conflict
                    with  France.  His  position  in  the  region  was  transformed  when  he
                    succeeded in securing the services of Andrea Doria and the powerful
                    Genoese fleet in 1528. Two years later he transferred the island of Malta,
                    hitherto  part  of  the  Sicilian  realm,  to  the  Knights  of  St.  John  to
                    compensate them for the loss of Rhodes and make sure of their future
                    cooperation. He also insisted that they maintained a base in Tripoli. For
                    a brief period after peace was signed between Charles V and his French
                    rival, Francis I, in 1529 it looked as if Christendom might be able to
                    unite against the Ottomans. But Francis I was unwilling to abandon the
                    friendly  relations  he  had  established  with  Süleyman,  and  the  Holy
                    League which was formed and successfully took Ottoman-held ports in




                                                Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
                                                           ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa)  ISSN 1828-230X (online)
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