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The “reluctant” admiral: Damad Halil Pasha and the Ottoman navy (1595-1598) 21
Some sources mention Halil Pasha’s preoccupation when he was
informed that the Spanish navy was gathered in Messina . This situ-
51
ation must have discouraged him from launching an attack on the
Italian coasts or from going to Marseille, even if it was a rhetorical
promise. Halil Pasha, without advancing more, returned in the first
days of November to Istanbul, thus realizing his first and last cam-
paign as kapudan pasha .
52
In 1597, the tension in the international politics and its reverbera-
tions in the Mediterranean had eased considerably. The sultan had
won a decisive victory in Hungary, Henry IV had started to exert his
authority over Marseille, and Clissa was retaken by the Ottomans .
53
Furthermore, the possibility of Philip II intervening in the Mediterra-
nean and the Adriatic became impossible with the English attack on
the port of Cadiz in July 1596, which diverted the Spanish maritime
attention towards its own coasts . In Istanbul, the reduction of the
54
tension in the Mediterranean was reflected in the decreased volume of
the maritime preparations in the arsenal. The Spanish avisos repeat-
edly reported that “no saldrá armada gruesa ni en forma” . Thus, in
55
the summer of 1597, the sultan sent a very small fleet composed of
less than 30 galleys whose command was again entrusted to Arnavud
Memi . The testimony of the documents points at again Halil Pasha’s
56
reluctance to sail, this time the justification being the small size of the
navy: “Halil Baxa will not set out with them [the galleys] for not being
a substantial armada” . Although there is no documentary confirma-
57
tion, Halil Pasha’s arbitrary exercise of his office could only be possible
under the patrimonial protection of Safiye Sultan, whose authority in
51 The Marques of Hierace to Philip II, Palermo, 18 August 1596, Ags.E, 1158, n. 98-
99: «que la armada de Su Magestad se hallava en Mecina, lo cual ha puesto mucho
terror y miedo a la dicha Armada». Braudel argues that it was the admiral of the Spanish
navy, Gian Andrea Doria, who avoided encountering the Ottoman navy, but the same
reservation is also valid for Halil Pasha. F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediter-
ranean World cit., p. 1230.
52 Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki cit., pp. 637-638.
53 C. Desplat, «Henri IV et les Ottomans», in Avènement d’Henri IV. Henri IV: le roi et
la reconstruction du royaume, Association Henri IV, Pau, 1990, pp. 395-422.
54 E. Tenace, A Strategy of Reaction: The Armadas of 1596 and 1597 and the Spanish
Struggle for European Hegemony, «The English Historical Review», 118/478 (2003), pp.
855-882.
55 Íñigo de Mendoza to Philip II, Venice, 3 May 1597, Ags.E, 1676, n. 49.
56 «Los ultimos avisos de Levante son de 10 de julio y a los 2 del mismo salió Memi
Baxa con 30 galeras y quatro galeotas del Puerto de Constantinopla». Íñigo de Mendoza
to Philip II, Venice, 9 August 1597, Ags.E, 1676, n. 61.
57 «Que los baxeles que saldrán serán hasta veinte y cinco pero añaden que…no
saldrá con ellos Helil Baxa por no ser armada de sustancia». Íñigo de Mendoza to Philip
II, Venice, 24 May 1597, Ags.E, 1676, n. 51.
Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XX - Aprile 2023
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)