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376 Evrim Türkçelik

The conquest of Tunis in modern historiography

Most of the general surveys of Süleyman’s Mediterranean policy as
well as the few articles focusing on Barbarossa’s conquest of Tunis
have interpreted it either as part of Süleyman’s preconceived plans, or
as Barbarossa’s unauthorized and opportunistic expedition. İdris
Bostan stands out among those who took the position that the
objective of the Ottoman fleet from the outset was to conquer Tunis.
According to him, the year 1534 was a symbolic year in which the
sultan bestowed the office of admiral on Barbarossa, established the
province of Cezâyir-i Bahr-i Sefîd for him and sent him to take Tunis.
Bostan argues that the real target of the Ottomans was to end the
internal struggles for the Tunisian throne among the ruler and his
brothers in favour of the Ottomans, and to block Spanish influence in
Tunis, whose ruler, Mulay Hassan, had allied with Charles V and
become one of his vassals in North Africa . The Ottomans were to play
8
a decisive role in this struggle because in the previous year, Mulay
Rashid, the brother of Mulay Hassan and pretender to the Tunisian
throne, had taken refuge in Algiers with Barbarossa and was brought
by him to Istanbul where he appealed for Ottoman aid. Bostan also
refers to an archival finance register of the spring of 1534 relating to
the naval preparations in which the destination of the armada was
indicated as diyâr-ı Mağrib . However, whether this term referred to
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Algiers or Tunis or to the whole of North Africa is not specified.
Moreover, Bostan discusses the conquest of Tunis in the context of
the incipient French-Ottoman alliance and argues that the
international conjunction of the war between Charles V and Francis I
and the anti-Habsburg rapprochement between the French and the
Ottomans were key factors behind the decision to conquer Tunis .
10
Svat Soucek interprets the capture of Tunis as a strategic move that
paralleled the sultan’s conquest of Iraq and argues that Barbarossa
might have discussed this strategy with the sultan and İbrahim Pasha.
According to Soucek, the principal objective was to take advantage of
the strategic position of Tunis with its suitable gulfs and ports for

8 İ. Bostan, Kanuni ve Akdeniz Siyaseti (1530-1550) [Kanuni Süleyman and the
Mediterranean Politics], in Ö. Kumrular (ed.), Muhteşem Süleyman [Süleyman the
Magnificent], Kitap Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2007, p. 28.
9 İ. Bostan, The Establishment of the Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid, in E. Zachariadou
(ed.), Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain, Crete University Press, Rethymnon, 2002,
p. 246.
10 İ. Bostan, Kanuni ve Akdeniz Siyaseti cit., pp. 28-31.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)