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The best-kept secret in the Mediterranean: Barbarossa’s 1534 Tunis campaign 377

concentrating a great fleet . In fact, Soucek bases his argument on the
11
account of Peçevî, a seventeenth century historian, who mentions that
Barbarossa sent a petition to Süleyman explaining the political and
military importance of Tunis and obtained the sultan’s approval for its
conquest. Following this line of argument, Özlem Kumrular argues in her
analysis of the 1534 campaign that Barbarossa managed to convince the
sultan to appreciate the strategic importance of North Africa and take
advantage of the dynastic problems and chaotic situation in Tunis.
Moreover, on the basis of speculative spy reports from Spanish archives,
she maintains that Sultan Süleyman ordered Barbarossa to conquer
Tunis because the intense naval preparations and military mobilization
in Istanbul were signs of an organized campaign rather than a simple
naval expedition into the Mediterranean .
12
However, the same Spanish sources have been the basis for the
argument that Barbarossa’s conquest of Tunis was his personal
initiative, without specific instructions from the sultan. According to
José María del Moral, Barbarossa’s main objective was to land in
Naples and not in Tunis. In support of his opinion, he refers to
intelligence reports, which assured the Spanish authorities that the
principal target of the Ottoman fleet was the Kingdom of Naples. He
argues that Barbarossa’s attack was not part of a premeditated plan,
and that Tunis became his target only after he had failed to carry out
a significant attack on Naples . Another contribution which follows
13
this line of thinking was offered by Emrah Safa Gürkan who, while
emphasizing, like Soucek, the chief strategic objectives of the 1534
campaign, agrees with the contention that Barbarossa had no formal
authorisation to do so, but decided on his own initiative to take
Tunis . For Gürkan, the conquest of Tunis is further proof that
14
corsairs could shape Ottoman Mediterranean policy by carrying out
measures they had devised to suit their own interests .
15

11 S. Soucek, Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete,
«Studia Islamica», 98/99 (2004), p. 228.
12 Ö. Kumrular, İspanyol ve İtalyan Arşiv Kaynakları Işığında Barbaros’un 1534 Seferi
[Barbarossa’s 1534 Expedition in the light of Spanish and Italian Archival Sources], in Ö.
Kumrular (ed.), Yeni Belgeler Işığında Osmanlı-Habsburg Düellosu [The Ottoman-Habsburg
Duel in the light of New Documents], Kitap Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2011, pp. 195-196.
13 J.M. del Moral, El Virrey de Napoles Don Pedro de Toledo y la guerra contra el Turco,
Instituto de Estudios Africanos, Madrid, 1966, p. 169.
14 E.S. Gürkan, Osmanlı-Habsburg Rekabeti Çerçevesinde Osmanlılar’ın XVI. Yüzyıl’ daki
Akdeniz Siyaseti, [Ottoman Mediterranean Policy in the Sixteenth Century in the framework
of Ottoman-Habsburg Competition], in H. Çoruh (ed.), Osmanlı Dönemi Akdeniz Dünyası
[The Mediterranean World during the Ottoman Period], Yeditepe, İstanbul, 2011, pp. 25-26.
15 E.S. Gürkan, The Centre and the Frontier: Ottoman Cooperation with the North African
Corsairs in the Sixteenth Century, «Turkish Historical Review», 1:2 (2010), p. 150.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)