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434 María José Rodríguez-Salgado

Süleyman, that too had changed from being an additional tool to an
essential requirement, as the Ottomans were the best allies available
against the emperor . An adherent of a “domino theory” of politics,
91
Giustiniano saw Tunis as the start of a run that would give Charles V
control of Italy and the German lands, then Ghelders and England,
finishing with Denmark which his niece would rule. Francis I would
be completely isolated and forced to do the emperor’s bidding.
However, Giustiniano also appreciated that Francis I believed he could
benefit from the emperor’s victory, as it could make the Venetians and
the pope fearful enough to call on him to preserve their freedom . In
92
this he was certainly correct. The Pope had already discussed with the
Venetian ambassador in Rome how best to prevent Charles V from
getting more power over Italy, and mooted a league with France.
93
Francis I deliberately stoked fears, accusing Charles V of seeking
hegemony – monarchia – and offering the pope support if the emperor
attempted to coerce him . Consequently, when the imperialists
94
publicised details of Francis I’s negotiations with Süleyman taken from
intercepted documents, few joined them in condemnation . Even the
95
emperor’s Italian allies wanted Francis I as a credible counter-balance.
The unusual levels of secrecy and the scant public attention given
to the emperor’s victory in the French court was made possible by
Francis I’s decision to tour the French provinces during these months.
This enabled him to avoid large, public audiences and deprived the
imperialists of the fora that the frequent, public occasions in Paris
would have provided to extoll the emperor’s success. It also gave the
French time to digest the news and discuss the implications in secret.
Once the initial impact of the victory passed, it was soon apparent that
it had not been decisive. All the planning beforehand had considered
scenarios where one or other of the contenders destroyed the other.
On 17 August the French government learnt from the Venetian
ambassador that Barbarossa had embarked safely in Bona for
Istanbul with twelve galleys packed with troops, as Doria had failed to

91 Ivi, p. 66.
92 Ivi, p. 56.
93 Csp Sp, 5 (1), n. 197, Lope de Soria to the Emperor, 22 August 1535. Du Bellay,
II, pp. 102-110, Du Bellay and Denonville to Francis I, Rome, 23 September 1535.
94 Ang, Carpi, pp. 63-65, Carpi to Ricalcato, 21-22 August 1533: «non haver alcun
che possa impedir’ ch’el [Charles V] non arrivi a la Monarchia eccetto il Re di Francia»
(p. 65). Du Bellay, II, p. 104, Du Bellay and Denonville, 23 September 1535, boasted to
Francis I: «Et de ce ... nostred. Sainct-Pere a eu en partie advis par les siens mesmes,
en partie nous luy avons si bien insinué et faict insinuer qu’il le tient pour tout
veritable».
95 Du Bellay, II, pp. 93ff. details of the incident.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)