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438 María José Rodríguez-Salgado

VIII and Cromwell and the norm was for such important documents
to be presented at a formal, public audience. None was granted, so
Chapuys sent another envoy with them. The king again instructed
Cromwell to give him some money and to inform Chapuys that he
could not have been more delighted with the victory if it had been his
own, and that he congratulated the emperor warmly. On 10 September
Cromwell transmitted the message in writing 114 . The offense was so
patent, Chapuys reported the bare facts and commented bitterly: «God
knows how much more he would have given [the envoy] for contrary
news» 115 . According to the envoy, however, the reaction of the English
king and courtiers to the news was extreme. He claimed that Cromwell
had been left speechless, and the English courtiers so astonished and
dismayed he thought they resembled a pack of dogs falling out of a
window. Chapuys contrasted this with the rejoicing of «the English
people» outside the court who loved Charles V 116 . The king and his
court remained inaccessible to Chapuys, who persevered by sending
information. He had to be content with polite letters from Cromwell
informing him that Henry VIII was «very interested» in the details, and
that some of the accounts were so vivid Cromwell could almost
imagine himself there 117 .
In other words, Henry VIII followed a similar strategy to that of
Francis I. Both belittled the emperor’s victory indirectly by starving it
of publicity. Henry VIII took it a stage further by avoiding direct
contact with the ambassador so that he was not associated with its
promulgation or celebration. He deprived the imperialists of a public
forum to disseminate the news and praise the emperor. It took
repeated demands from the ambassador before even Cromwell agreed
to meet him - on 13 October. Even then, it took place late in the day
and in private 118 . Chapuys’s disappointment is reflected in his
comment that he hoped Henry VIII would be punished for «his impious
folly and dishonourable joy at the descent of Barbarossa on Naples
and at Tunis [in 1534]». To add insult to injury, false rumours spread
that Charles V had written friendly letters to Henry VIII during the
campaign and entrusted him with the defence of the Low Countries 119 .
Worse still, the victory made no difference to Henry VIII’s policy, nor
did it ameliorate his treatment of the Catholics or of Queen Katherine
and princess Mary, as the imperialists had hoped. Indeed its impact

114 Ivi, n. 326, Cromwell to Chapuys, 10 September 1535.
115 Ivi, n. 356, Chapuys to Charles V, 13 September 1535.
116 Ivi, n. 357, Chapuys to Granvelle, 13 September 1535.
117 Ivi, n. 484, Winchester, 30 September 1535.
118 Ivi, n. 594, Chapuys to Charles V, 13 October 1535.
119 From the summary in Ivi, n. 595, Chapuys to Granvelle, 13 October 1535.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)