Page 128 - sfogliabile 49
P. 128

394                                                    Evrim Türkçelik


                Ottoman historiographers went on producing over the years were not
                combined  into  a  single,  coherent  interpretation.  Thus,  modern
                historiography on the conquest of Tunis has been caught between two
                extremes  and  has  suffered  from  that  uncertainty  until  today.  This
                article,  while  dwelling  upon  the  historiographical  quandary  that
                Barbarossa’s conquest of Tunis in 1534 represented, has revealed that
                there was a real stalemate among the sources, which has turned the
                issue of the authorization of the conquest of Tunis into a conundrum.
                   Until now, modern historians have found the most obvious statement
                of  sultan’s  authorization  only  in  the  mid-seventeenth  century.  The
                validity of this source has been challenged by the most recent literature
                basing that challenge on the belief that no contemporary source existed
                of an order by the sultan. This article has shown that an authorization
                by the sultan was alleged already in the early sixteenth century. Thus,
                immediately  after  the  contest  for  Tunis,  the  main  historiographical
                tendency was to emphasize the existence of an order by the sultan. After
                then,  Ottoman  historiographical  practice  experimented  with  silence,
                denial,  accusation  and  manipulation  in  its  handling  of  this  topic.
                Especially,  the  emphasis  of  panegyric  historiographical  activity  was
                constrained  for  a  considerable  time  by  the  exigencies  of  dynastic
                concerns and dynastic propaganda. Their content was updated according
                to political and dynastic interests so that the sultan was totally removed
                from the decision and so entirely untouched by the humiliating defeat of
                Barbarossa  in  1535.  In  a  period  when  the  Ottomans  perceived
                themselves as exceptional in universal history and portrayed the sultan’s
                struggle against Habsburgs and Safavids from imperial and messianic
                perspectives, it would have been impossible to recognize the failure at
                Tunis  as  a  result  of  Süleyman’s  own  plans,  given  that  the  emperor
                commemorated  his  victory  for  years  to  come  as  the  greatest  victory
                against the Ottoman Empire.
                   Would or could Barbarossa have dared to conquer Tunis without
                the consent of Sultan Süleyman? We cannot completely rule out an
                opportunistic  move  by  Barbarossa,  which  would  be  completely
                compatible with his previous career particularly as the ruler of Algiers.
                However,  there  is  no  convincing  evidence  of  this.  The  existence  of
                different narratives, official interventions, deliberate manipulation and
                what appears in retrospect as an attempt to relegate it to oblivion only
                reinforces doubts over such an interpretation. Considering the period
                in which these narratives were produced and the historical genres in
                which they appeared, accepting that the conquest of Tunis in 1534
                was the result of the sultan’s authorization would surely be a more
                appropriate response and much closer to the historical reality.






                Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
                ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa)  ISSN 1828-230X (online)
   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133