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398 Miguel Ángel de Bunes Ibarra

also agreed to give financial subsidies to the tribal leaders of lands
surrounding the Spanish presidios (the fortified outposts they had
established in the region) so as to ensure their continued support for
these settlements. For example, he paid an annual pension of 500,000
maravedíes to the tribal leader they called the Infante of Bugía (Béjaïa,
Algeria) to reinforce the security of the small garrison stationed in
8
that city under the command of Perafán de Ribera . In fact, even before
9
the 1530s the emperor had forged intimate contacts with the Hafsid
dynasty, as evinced by the fact that a Hafsid princess who had
converted to Christianity was given a dowry by the empress so that
she could enter a convent in Barcelona. Even more telling - and a clear
sign of respect for the longstanding relations between them, of course
- was the fact that Charles V went to Tunis in person to restore Mulay
Hassan to power over his dominions, rather than to conquer the region
and take it for himself .
10
It is universally accepted that Charles V decided to mount the Tunis
campaign so as to prove to his contemporaries that he was capable of
personally commanding military forces, and to establish himself as the
defender of Christendom . What has not been studied or appreciated
11
is that financially, the expedition was quite out of the ordinary, and
that the campaign had a significant impact not only on the internal
financial structures of the emperor’s lands, but also on his foreign
policy . Quite simply, it was on a different scale from anything he had
12
done to date. It is true that even before this, imperial campaigns had
placed a great economic burden on his subjects, especially in Castile
and the Low Countries; but he had never organised a campaign that

8 Ags, 462, s. f., Charles V to the Council of the Finances, 14 February 1535.
Summaries from some of these documents were included in É. De La Primaudaie,
Documents inédits sur l’occupation espagnole en Afrique (1506-1594), A. Jourdan, Alger,
1875, passim.
9 R. Gutiérrez Cruz, Los presidios españoles del norte de África en tiempos de los
Reyes Católicos, Consejería de Cultura, Melilla, 1997.
10 S. Boubaker, L'empereur Charles Quint et le roi Mawlay al-Hasan (1520-1535), in
S. Boubaker, C. Ilham Álvarez Dopico (eds.), Empreintes espagnoles dans l'histoire
tunisienne, Trea, Gijón, 2011, pp. 13-82.
11 M.J. Rodríguez Salgado, ¿Carolus Africanus?: el Emperador y el turco, in J.
Martínez Millán (ed.), Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-
1558), Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos
V, Madrid, vol. I, pp. 487-531.
12 This aspect emerges clearly from the imperial negotiations for a closer alliance
with Genoa: «… porque demás de ser la puerta de Italia tienen fuerças por la mar y
aparejos para ellas más que en otra parte y dineros que aunque cuestan caros se hallan
lo de aquí consiste todo en el príncipe mayormente que el que agora es duque y el son
una…». Ags, E, 1366, n. 154, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa,
March 1533.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)