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Juan De Rena and the financing of the Tunis campaign             399


                    combined a huge fleet with a powerful, sophisticated land force and
                    this proved to be much more expensive. The military and naval forces
                    were levied not only from the emperor’s vast, scattered territories, but
                    also  from  allied  lands,  ranging  from  the  sailors  of  Malaga  to  the
                    German  and  Swiss  landsknechts.  To  achieve  his  aim  of  defeating
                    Barbarossa, Charles V seized the treasures that had come from the
                    conquest of Peru and not just what belonged to the crown.  He also
                    confiscated  the  money  and  goods  belonging  to  others,  whether
                    merchants, religious institutions or private individuals. These funds
                    enabled Charles V to avoid calling the Cortes and demanding another
                    extraordinary subsidy from Castile to pay for the war. However, this
                    does not mean that Castile was spared financially. The campaign has
                    been generally considered as the beginning of a long-term and highly
                    damaging process that led to massive exports of specie and precious
                    metals from Castilian lands .
                                               13
                       Be that as it may, the campaign was unquestionably one of the
                    most expensive foreign wars of the whole of the sixteenth century. Yet,
                    unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to calculate the economic impact
                    of this expedition because so much documentation has been lost, and
                    what  remains  is  dispersed  and  fragmentary.  The  very  extent  and
                    complexity of the organisation required to put the campaign together
                    makes it impossible to agree even on the number of people who took
                    part  in  the  conquest  of  La  Goletta.    The  imperial  forces  had  to  be
                    moved from their diverse places of origin to a single meeting point;
                    something that could only be done piecemeal and over a considerable
                    period of time. New contingents continued to join the expedition as
                    late as the siege of La Goletta, as Charles V noted in a letter to the
                    viceroy  of  Navarre .  From  the  west  came  contingents  from  the
                                       14
                    Netherlands and Portugal, and the soldiers and artillery of Malaga.
                    The Iberian fleet was gradually assembled in the port of Barcelona.  All
                    ships still in Iberian waters were ordered to sail to the Sardinian port
                    of  Cagliari  where  they  were  joined  by  the  Neapolitan  and  Sicilian
                    galleys and other vessels under the command of the marquis del Vasto
                    carrying  soldiers  from  Lombardy,  Naples,  Sicily  as  well  as  German


                       13  «Una gran parte de gasto se cubriría fuera de España. Aquí quedaría el dinero que
                    costara lo que en casa se hiciera en las faenas de los astilleros, catalanes, murcianos y
                    andaluces, donde se aprestaban las naves, y en la requisa de las embarcaciones fletadas
                    con  el  mismo  destino,  y  las  obligaciones  inherentes  a  la  dotación  de  soldados  y  de
                    marineros  y  la  provisión  de  equipos,  vituallas,  artillería  y  todos  los  imprescindibles
                    pertrechos». R. Carande, Carlos V y sus banqueros, Crítica, Barcelona, 1977, vol. II, pp.
                    104-105.
                       14  Argn, Ap Rena, 76, n. 14, Charles V to the Viceroy of Navarre, count of Cañete, La
                    Goleta, 30 June 1535.


                                                Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
                                                           ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa)  ISSN 1828-230X (online)
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