Page 131 - sfogliabile 49

Juan De Rena and the financing of the Tunis campaign 397

However, the rapid reaction of Charles V on hearing that
Barbarossa and the Ottoman forces had sacked much of the coast of
Naples in 1534 and gone on to conquer Tunis, suggests that he may
have already decided to take the initiative in the conflict against the
Ottoman empire. What he particularly feared in 1534 was that the
Ottoman squadron would attack the Mediterranean coast of Spain,
and to counter this he ordered wide-ranging defensive measures to be
implemented, as spies based in Venice reported . The emperor wanted
4
to take the initiative to halt the expansion of the Ottoman empire now
that Barbarossa had destroyed the statu quo that had existed between
the two great Mediterranean empires in the Maghreb. Some years
earlier, Charles V had signed an alliance with Venice , which resulted
5
in the conquest of Corón in the southern Peloponnese in 1532 . For
6
tactical reasons, the emperor had in effect compartmentalised the
Osmanli threat, creating two distinct fronts: one maritime, the other
on land. He handed over responsibility for the defence of the German
lands to his brother, Ferdinand I, and assumed full responsibility for
the Mediterranean front . The proximity of the Tunisian Hafsid princes
7
to the Maghrebian states controlled by the successors of the
Barbarossa brothers had already prompted the emperor to offer
protection to various members of the Hafsid dynasty after 1530. He

y niños y llevados detenidos esclavos y cautivos. Teniendo el dicho Barbarroja la armada
del mar del Turco, de que él era Capitán General, con la cual con cerca de trescientas
velas, así galeras, fustas y bergantines, como otros navíos de mar bien proveídos de
gente de mar, artillerías y municiones, se había partido de Constantinopla y venido al
Reino de Berbería. Y había tomado la fortaleza del puerto de La Goleta de Túnez, y
asimismo la ciudad y los puertos de África, de Bona y de Bizerta, fronteras del dicho
Reino de Berbería cercanos de los dichos Reinos y tierras marítimas del Emperador,
mayormente de las islas de Sicilia, Cerdeña, Mallorca y Menorca».
4 The measures taken to defend Valencia have been studied by J.F. Pardo Molero,
La defensa del imperio. Carlos V, Valencia y el Mediterráneo, Sociedad Estatal para la
Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, Madrid, 2001, pp. 289-306.
5 «Antes de que recibiera la de v. majestad: yo havia entendido con esta Republica
havia recibido cartas de sus embaxadores por los quales avisaban de lo que V. Majestad
me escribe y sobre ello tovieron su consejo con los procuradores y el Príncipe y otros
particulares personas principales y con el parecer del dicho Príncipe y de todos fue
concluydo de entrar en la Liga y contribuye en ella de la manera que dire». Ags, E, 1366,
n. 153, Gómez de Figueroa to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, February 1533. The
ambassador is referring to the discussions relating to the creation of a League or alliance
to mount an attack against Algiers, the chief corsair base in the region, where the
Barbarossa had settled from the early sixteenth century. M.Á. Bunes Ibarra, Los
Barbarroja. Corsarios del Mediterráneo, Aldebarán, Madrid, 2004.
6 G. Varriale, Nápoles y el azar de Corón (1532-1534), «Tiempos Modernos», 22
(2011), pp. 1-32.
7 Ö. Kumrular, El duelo entre Carlos V y Solimán el Magnífico (1520-1535), ISIS,
Estambul, 2005.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)