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426 María José Rodríguez-Salgado

was true, and made disparaging references to the emperor’s shameful
withdrawal from Coron, emphasising that local Christians had failed
to support him and returned under the rule of the Ottomans. Chapuys
justified what he had said about Süleyman on the grounds that he
believed it to be true, and he went on to make an interesting point: «to
affirm or deny that news was a matter of indifference and did not alter
the case … each party might construe the report according to his
wishes». He went on to attack the Christian credentials of his host by
arguing that Coron would still be in Christian hands if other princes
had supported the emperor, and that Charles V would not be facing
such dangers if Henry VIII emulated his noble predecessors who led
crusades to the Holy Land. The king answered coldly that those were
different times, when England had Guyenne which facilitated these
expeditions . A day after this tense audience, on 6 June, Chapuys
45
received the emperor’s announcement that he had set sail for Italy,
but before he could inform the English king, the French ambassador
disseminated news from the imperial court that Charles V and the
Venetians would attack Istanbul. Chapuys thought this was false, but
without information from the emperor he could not refute it . The stir
46
caused by the Persian victory over Süleyman died down when the
Venetians confirmed they would not abandon their alliance with
Süleyman and Charles V failed to offer to lead such a campaign .
47
The French ambassador to the Porte, La Forêt, returned from his
talks with the Ottoman court at the height of these wild rumours and
his return caused hardly a stir. The concern remained what the
emperor’s true target might be . Duchhardt argued that the one
48
important consequence of the imperial campaign against Tunis,
indeed its masterstroke, was the success of imperial propaganda
condemning Francis I’s alliance with the Muslims, which he believes
isolated the French king . But it was precisely his isolation that made
49

45 Csp Sp., 5(1) n. 170, Chapuys to Charles V, 5 June 1535, variants in LP, viii, n.
826.
46 Csp Sp. 5(1), n. 174, Chapuys to Charles V, 6 June 1535.
47 Ags, E, 1311, f. 20, Lope de Soria to Charles V, 21 May 1535. LP, viii, n. 876,
Chapuys to Charles V, 16 June 1535; n. 899, Edmund Harvel from Venice, 19 June
1535.
48 LP, viii, n. 807, Gregorio Casale to Cromwell, 1 June 1535; n. 874, Harvel to
Thomas Starkey, 15 June 1535; Bernandin Sandro to Thomas Starkey, Padua, same
date. Thomas Batcock to Cromwell on 22 June with details of the emperor’s forces and
confirming he would attack Tunis.
49 H. Duchhardt, Das Tunisunternehmen cit., esp. pp. 58-61. «Der Tuniszug war
unter diesem Gesichtspunkt also auch eine politische Meisterleistung, die über den
momentanen militärischen Erfolg weit hinauswies» (p. 61) but notes it made no
difference to his pro-Ottoman stance.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)