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«No great glory in chasing a pirate». The manipulation of news during the 1535 421

Süleyman’s dominance of North Africa and that the union of Ottoman
and corsair forces represented a novel and extremely dangerous threat
to Christendom, and Italy in particular. He also claimed that
«Barbarossa’s enterprise is intended solely to favour the interests of
the said king of France», since Francis I was known to be considering
an alliance with the Ottomans . Despite the danger, most Italian
11
states refused to support the imperial campaign. The Venetians were
allied to Süleyman and, along with the rest, feared an imperial victory
would make Charles V more powerful in the peninsula . Only Genoa
12
and Paul III agreed to send naval contingents, the former paid for by
imperial funds and the latter in exchange for military support against
the duke of Urbino and Henry VIII, neither of whom Charles V wanted
to attack . The high cost of their support prompted several imperial
13
counsellors to advise against a campaign in North Africa; others
opposed it on the grounds that Francis I was a more serious threat.
Only a few imperial counsellors urged immediate action to expel the
Ottoman-corsair forces from Tunis , among them Andrea Doria,
14
Genoese admiral of the imperial fleet and one of Charles V’s most
influential military advisers. Doria was convinced that if left alone,
Barbarossa would also take Sardinia . Security concerns fused with
15
considerations of honour. As Gómez Suárez de Figueroa put it to
Charles V, the whole world was watching «to assess what forces you
have to destroy such a powerful enemy» . Imperial advisers were also
16
divided whether to strike against Barbarossa in Algiers or Tunis. The
former would remove a great danger to Iberia; the latter would benefit
Italy .
17

11 Charles V’s instructions for Adrian de Croÿ, 1 February 1535, KFI, V, pp. 161-
169, this at 163 and cit. 164.
12 Csp Sp, 5 (1), n. 100, Count of Cifuentes to Charles V, Rome, 18 October 1534.
13 Doria and other imperial officials were instructed to solicit aid from the pope and
others, Csp SP, 5 (1) the emperor’s instructions to Tello de Guzmán, 7 December 1534.
14 Ags, E, 1367, ff. 96-97, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V, 18 October 1534.
15 Ags, E, 1367, f. 20, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V, 11 November 1534.
Gregorio Casale to Cromwell, 24 October 1534, LP, vii, n. 1298 reporting Doria’s visit to
Rome.
16 Ags, E, 1367, ff. 104-107, Gómez Suárez de Figueroa to Charles V, 12 December
1534: «por importar tanto a v. magd. este negocio para el venefiçio de la empresa y
honrra de sus reynos q todo el mundo esta a mirar el esfuerço y pod[e]r de v. Magd.
para deshazer tan Rezio enemigo».
17 M.J. Rodríguez Salgado, ¿Carolus Africanus?: el Emperador y el turco, in J.
Martínez Millán (ed.), Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530-
1558), Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos
V, Madrid, 2000, vol. I, pp. 487-531, esp. 504-507; J.M. Jover Zamora, Carlos V y los
Españoles, Rialp, Madrid, 1963, explored the “Spanish” position.

Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa) ISSN 1828-230X (online)