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«No great glory in chasing a pirate». The manipulation of news during the 1535   443


                    find out what price the emperor was willing to pay for his alliance 150 .
                    When news of Süleyman’s latest defeat reached Europe, the pope’s call
                    for  a  campaign  against  the  Ottomans  went  unheeded 151 .  Ironically,
                    Francis I now found it expedient to exaggerate the importance of the
                    emperor’s victory at Tunis, in order to increase fear of the emperor’s
                    power and facilitate an anti-Habsburg Christian alliance 152 . He also
                    turned the emperor’s propaganda against him. To make the point that
                    he had no territorial ambitions, Charles V had given a great deal of
                    publicity to his decision to give Tunis back to Mulay Hassan. This had
                    prompted  some  negative  propaganda  presenting  him  as  a  lover  of
                    Muslims, more closely allied to them than Francis I. Now it gave the
                    French a powerful argument: if Charles V could give a whole kingdom
                    to  a  Muslim  ruler  who  did  not  deserve  it,  why  could  he  not  give  a
                    Christian prince the duchy that belonged to him and thus guarantee
                    peace  in  Christendom?  153   The  fate  of  Milan  was  regarded  as
                    transcendental and overshadowed all other news  154 . As 1536 dawned,
                    all the talk was of war between Charles V and Francis I.


                    Conclusion

                       The material provided by the imperial secretariat was impressive in
                    quantity and in its method of dissemination, but it was far from the
                    only material in circulation about the Tunis campaign. Its impact was
                    short-lived for many reasons, not least the lack of substantial gains
                    by the emperor, and the short time span between victory and defeat.
                    Even  supporters  of  the  emperor  such  as  the  English  Catholics
                    diminished  his  triumph  in  an  effort  to  call  attention  to  their  own
                    cause; others feared his additional power and so muted their response.
                    Francis I and Henry VIII chose not only to dissimulate, but to delay
                    and stifle news from Tunis; in effect, to starve the news of the oxygen
                    of publicity. By doing so they successfully limited the impact of the


                       150  Csp SP, 5 (1), n. 246, Chapuys to Charles V, 30 December 1535.
                       151   V.-L.  Bourrilly  (ed.),  Lettres  Rabelais  cit.,  pp.  42-43,  Rabelais  to  Geoffroy
                    d’Estissac, Rome, 30 December 1535.
                       152  Ang, Carpi, p. 86, Carpi to Ricalcato, 12 Novenber 1535. News arrived on 10
                    November. The nuncio wrote the previous day (ivi, pp. 85-86): «quelli che naturalmente
                    non devono voler lo Imperatore così grande in Italia».
                       153  P. Giovio, Lettere Volgari cit., Giovio to Carpi, Roma, 28 December 1535. Ang,
                    Carpi, p. 242, Carpi to Ricalcato, 12 March 1537, reporting the complaint of Francis I,
                    «che l’Imperatore é andato in Africa ad acquistar un regno, per lassarlo poi a un infidele
                    et che ad un Re di Francia, suo cognato, non vol rendere’quel cosî ingiustamente si
                    ritien del suo».
                       154  Du Bellay, II, pp. 202 and 210.


                                                Mediterranea - ricerche storiche - Anno XVII - Agosto 2020
                                                           ISSN 1824-3010 (stampa)  ISSN 1828-230X (online)
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